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Abstract 
The notion of structure of evolution is proposed to capture what it means to say that two 
situations exhibit the same or similar constellations of factors affecting evolution. The 
key features of holobiont evolution and the hologenome theory are used to define a 
holobiont structure of evolution. Finally, Cultural Group Selection, a set of hypotheses 
regarding the evolution of human cognition, is shown to match the holobiont structure 
closely though not perfectly. 
Introduction 
Holobionts are entities consisting of a host and its persistent symbiotic microorganisms, 
making up an integrated biological entity (see Gilbert et al., this volume). The 
paradigmatic example being reef building corals, in which algal symbionts produce 
carbon compounds for the backbone and the host provides the symbionts with nutrients 
and a hospitable habitat. Proponents of the hologenome theory (to which and to related 
views I will refer as the holobiont perspective) argue that holobionts are units of 
selection. In other words, that there is selection on the holobiont, not only on the partners. 
There are ongoing debates on whether this is the case and on exactly what the claim 
amounts to (see Gilbert et al. this volume, Lloyd, this volume). Here I am going to mostly 
side-step these debates and suggest focusing on the evolutionary consequences of the 
holobiont model more generally. The holobiont notion refers to several features that 
distinguish holobionts, among them symbiosis with microorganisms and specific 
variation mechanisms. These features support predictions that are specific to holobionts, 
most notably about the evolvability of holobionts and about coevolution among the 
partners. 
The discussion about whether holobionts are units of selection is in part an 
attempt to generalize – to provide an account of a large multitude of concrete cases. To 
supplement the discussion of holobionts as units of selection, I will propose the notion of 
structures of evolution – constellations of evolutionary relevant factors, which include 
selection, but also other factors, such as properties of heredity. I will then specify a 
particular structure of evolution that I will refer to as the holobiont structure of evolution. 
I will go over the evolutionary consequences of the holobiont structure, and argue that the 
structure of evolution perspective helps identify what differentiates holobiont evolution 
from other evolutionary scenarios. The key features I discuss are how the evolvability of 
the holobiont relies on the evolvability of the constituents and the coevolutionary 
opportunities differentiating holobionts from other collectives. To further test the utility 
of the holobtiont structure, I will consider whether the cultural group selection model of 
human evolution, concerned as it is with radically different phenomena, matches the 
holobiont structure and what can be gained by pursuing the analogy. This discussion 
shows that human groups have remarkable similarities with holobionts. 
The holobiont perspective as a generalization 
Nancy Moran and Daniel Sloan argue against the holobiont perspective: “The central 
claim of the hologenome concept, that a host and its microbiome together form the 
primary unit of selection, is sometimes true, and sometimes false; its validity will depend 
on the particular case.” And they further state that, “insofar as there is a primary unit of 
selection common to diverse biological systems, it is unlikely to be at the level of the 
holobiont” (Moran and Sloan 2015). Thus, Moran and Sloan take the debate about 
whether holobionts are units of selection to be concerned with the generalization that the 
holobiont is often the most relevant unit of selection. If true, this claim will support the 
further claim that holobionts are of general evolutionary significance. This generalization 
can serve as a heuristic advice: look for selection at the holobiont level, since this is often 
the unit targeted by natural selection. It is also sometimes suggested that holobionts 
played a crucial role in significant evolutionary junctures; this claim is distinct from the 
generalization identified by Moran and Sloan. 
To support the general claim, it is useful to enumerate many potential cases – as 
the proponents of the holobiont perspective do. It is also important to show that the 
factors that are together needed to make a given holobiont a unit of selection co-occur 
frequently or typically. Marshalling many examples of holobionts combined with an 
account of holobionts as units of selection may be intended as instantiating an inference 
to the best explanation: the holobiont unit of selection being the best explanation for the 
existence of many diverse holobionts; hence their existence supports the claim that 
holobionts are the important unit of selection. 
The general role of holobiont selection is attributed to the ubiquity of symbiosis 
with microorganisms. In support its proponents marshal large swaths of evidence from a 
wide variety of species. They also highlight the fact that microorganisms predate 
eukaryotes, had evolved important adaptations before eukaroytes came along, and were 
already present as potential partners. These considerations all point to the holobiont 
generalization being grounded in contingent empirical facts about the living world, not in 
nomological or logical necessity. It is not the claim that the holobiont notion logically 
entails sufficient conditions for something to be a unit of selection, nor that it is possible 
for a holobiont to be one. 
Granting holobionts may be units of selection (see Lloyd, this volume), and 
putting to one side the empirical support for the general importance of selection on 
holobionts, it is clear that holobionts have features that differentiate them from other 
systems. The holobiont notion is a claim about a whole class of systems that share 
properties that differentiate them from other systems. The holobiont notion can thus be 
seen as an abstraction, capturing the commonalities of these symbiotic partnerships and 
ignoring their other particulars. If it is a unit of selection, the holobiont is a specific type 
of unit of selection. For the rest of this chapter I will be concerned with the evolutionary 
features shared by holobionts that differentiate them from other units of selection. 
Scientific generalizations may be used for a variety of purposes, including 
summarizing information, making predictions, and explaining diverse phenomena. The 
questions to ask about a scientific generalization include its scope (e.g., is the claim about 
all animals or all eukaryotes?), its purported realism (is it intended to be true or is it 
merely presented as a phenomenological model?), and, when the generalization is 
truth-directed, what makes it true, whether it is a sharp or just an approximate claim (of 
the kind, most animals move around but not necessarily all of them), and the implications 
of the truth of the generalization (e.g., does it allow predictions?). 
Focusing on whether holobionts are units of selection may cause two kinds of 
difficulty. It may lead us to ignore the reason for the general significance of holobionts, 
i.e. the ubiquity of partnerships with microorganisms, and it draws attention away from 
the evolutionary features shared by holobionts that differentiate them from other units of 
selection. The focus on units of selection may thus obscure both the grounds and scope of 
the generalization and lead us to miss its real significance. 
Structures of evolution 
Both philosophers and evolutionary theorists have discussed and elucidated the notions of 
levels and units of selection for several decades, discussions that typically hark back to 
Lewontin’s criteria (Lewontin 1970). Elisabeth Lloyd has, over the years, clarified and 
organized this complex terrain and in her contribution to this volume she applies her 
perspective to the holobiont case. 
To supplement the various rich and enlightening analyses of the unit of selection 
notion, I want to consider here a related but fundamentally different question, namely 
what it means to say that two situations exhibit the same or similar constellations of 
factors affecting evolution, a notion I call structure of evolution. As an illustration, 
consider discussions about the evolution of altruism that focus on whether a group is, or 
can be, a level or unit of selection. A key part of the evolutionary explanation, in this 
case, is that group-level (or between-group) selection favors altruistic behavior while 
individual-selection (or within group) selection opposes it. The two levels and their 
opposition is an example of what I mean by structure of evolution. Articulating structures 
may involve identifying levels and their interaction, identifying the role of specific forms 
of transmission, drift versus selection, coevolutionary dynamics etc. 
In a classic discussion from the heyday of the group selection debate, John 
Maynard Smith noted that the conditions sufficient for something to undergo selection 
may not suffice for adaptation and so introduced the alternative notion unit of evolution 
(Maynard Smith 1987). Units of evolution require appropriate heredity, otherwise 
adaptations will not evolve: 
To qualify as a unit of evolution, it is not sufficient that an entity be selected for 
or against: it must have heredity. In contrasting units of evolution with units of 
selection, I am making a distinction different from that drawn by Dawkins (1976) 
between a “replicator” (i.e., an entity whose structure and information content is 
copied more or less precisely in the process of reproduction) and a “vehicle,” 
whose structure is not replicated, but that is the object upon which selection 
typically acts. Thus organisms are units of evolution, but they are not replicators. 
What makes organisms into units of evoluion is that 
i. they have heredity, in the sense in which Darwin would have used the word 
— that is, offspring resemble their parents — and 
ii. the replicators, or genes, that are responsible for heredity behave in a way that, 
typically, does not permit within-individual, between-replicator selection; thus 
in typical cell division one copy of each gene present in the mother cell is 
transmitted to each daughter cell, and in meiosis each member of a pair of 
genes is equally likely to be transmitted. 
Using this distinction Maynard Smith concluded that “whether an entity qualifies as a 
unit of evolution depends on the relationship between that entity and the replicators that 
are ultimately responsible for heredity. In this sense, the distinction between units of 
evolution and selection is less fundamental than that between replicators and vehicles. 
Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish between objects we can expect to evolve 
adaptations and those we cannot. In particular, selection may act between groups of 
organisms, but it does not follow that group adaptations will evolve” (my italics). 
The different interpretations of the notion of unit of selection that Lloyd provides 
(see her contribution in this volume) help clarify the issue that bothered Maynard Smith. 
The important point for my purposes here is different. The unit of evolution notion was 
introduced to identify one specific constellation of evolutionary factors and their 
relations. I refer to a specification of a constellation of evolutionary factors and their 
relations as a structure of evolution. The constellations of factors that make up structures 
of evolution may include factors that go beyond selection. I have mentioned three 
examples of structures of evolution: the altruism scenario, as described earlier, Maynard 
Smith’s definition of a unit of evolution, and the holobiont structure, which will be 
precisely defined in the following section.1 
Any evolutionary scenario may be understood as a structure of evolution, but 
some structures encompass more systems of interest than others and produce richer 
predictions or deeper understanding. A structure of evolution is intended to be a tool: the 
aim of identifying and specifying a structure of evolution is to provide scientists with a 
common framework and terminology and to elicit research questions and hypotheses that 
apply to many systems of interest. 
Rather than being a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, a structure is a 
characterization of various factors and their possible interactions; it need not refer to all 
factors that affect the evolution of the biological system. Moreover, the evolutionarily 
significant factors for understanding a specific system may change over time. 
The holobiont structure of evolution 
As a working definition, I define the holobiont structure of evolution to consist of the 
following: 
1. A host. 
2. Symbiotic partners. 
3. Genomes, of both the symbionts and the host. 
4. Vertical or quasi-vertical transmission of symbionts in holobiont reproduction. 
A few clarifications are in order. (3) refers to the fact that in holobionts the host and 
the symbionts all have their own genomes. Indeed, the hologenome notion refers to their 
combined genomes. Since there are many symbionts (i.e., many bacteria), the 
hologenome is of the form {multi-cellular host genome, {set of genomes of individual 
symbionts}}. The symbionts may be of multiple species. As the holobiont changes, both 
in ontogeny and phylogenetically, this collection changes; in particular the set of 
microorganisms fluctuates much more readily than evolutionary changes in the host 
genome. The hologenome is thus a statistical abstraction. The separate genomes of host 
and symbionts can coevolve. In contrast, paradigmatic groups and collectives do not have 
genomes that are independent and separate from the genomes of the individuals 
comprising them. 
As to (4), transmission, the holobiont as unit of selection discussion emphasizes the 
role of vertical transmission of symbionts; however microbiota can be acquired from the 
environment and the acquisition of the microbiome may be regulated (perhaps the best 
studied case is the Vibrio-squid system discussed below). The important factor is reliable 
parent-offpsring similarity, leading to a lineage of holobiont individuals, regardless of the 
details of the transmission process. 
Cultural Group Selection and holobionts: the parallel 
Cultural Group Selection (CGS) is a hypothesis about the evolution of human collectives. 
The key element of CGS is competition between groups, driven by cultural rather than 
genetic differences between them. This leads to group selection on cultural variation, 
which explains the functionality, purportedly at the group-level, of culture and of social 
institutions. The CGS model is committed to the idea that culture is an inheritance 
system, though we should be careful to distinguish between inheritance of the culture of a 
group, say when a group splits in two, and inheritance of cultural replicators (i.e., memes) 
among group members. According to CGS, human cognitive adaptations for social 
learning and pro-social behavior are the result of culture-led gene-culture coevolution. 
The debate whether this is the correct explanation is ongoing, and there are many nuances 
that I have elided. My purpose here is not to assess the CGS model but rather to note 
parallels between the evolutionary scenario it draws and the evolutionary scenario raised 
by holobionts. My primary aim in doing this is to assess the fertility of the holobiont 
structure of evolution as a device for thinking about diverse biological systems, and 
through this to assess the notion of structures of evolution more generally. With several 
important caveats that I will point out, I think the exercise highlights interesting aspects 
of both the CGS model and the hologenome theory. 
Human groups are in important ways more similar to holobionts than they are to 
mere collections of individuals. This is because they are characterized by group-level 
properties that are possibly best attributed to the group qua container rather than to the 
individuals within it. One reason to think this may be the case is the role of social 
institutions that shape and organize the group and that, in some sense, transcend 
individuals. Other reasons to explore this possibility include the idea that individuals in 
human groups operate in We-mode rather than I-mode (Tomasello 2014) and the 
suggestion that in early human society individuals and groups were more tightly 
integrated than they are today (Bader this volume, Jablonka this volume). I use the CGS 
model in developing the analogy with holobionts since it is a rich and well-developed set 
of ideas that can be directly related to the holobiont structure and because debates 
surrounding it resemble debates about holobionts. The following six sections examine 
these parallels. 
Holobionts as individuals and as groups 
Holobionts consist of multiple organisms comprising microorganisms of different kinds 
and a multi-cellular host. However, holobionts are not typical groups. First, they consist 
of multiple species. Gilbert et al. (this volume) refer to them as “multilineage biological 
entities.” Second, and more significantly, the holobiont host has its own genome. In other 
words, holobionts are not simply collections of individuals; the “container” (i.e., the 
host), as it were, is its own biological entity. I take this to be a defining characteristic of 
holobionts, distinguishing them from, on the one hand, collectives that consist of multiple 
individuals and nothing else, and, on the other hand, run of the mill symbiotic 
relationships in which several individuals are involved but the structure need not be that 
of a host and a population of multiple encompassed symbionts. 
The holobiont structure of evolution specifies the existence of separate genomes 
for the host and the symbiotic partners. In the CGS case the role of the host genome is 
played by culture and social institutions. Cultural groups have cultural traits that are, at 
least on a first approximation, separate from the traits of their constituent individuals and 
that exhibit descent with modification (Richerson et al. 2016). This fulfills the minimal 
demands of the structure, by having both a lineage forming container and 
lineage-forming individuals within it. 
Gilbert et al. (this volume) stress the individuality of holobionts. Expounding on 
holobionts as a special kind of individual, rather than as a special kind of collective, puts 
a second, different, strain on the analogy between human cultural groups and holobionts, 
since we typically do not consider human groups to be as tightly integrated. Perhaps a 
notion of a “loosely” coupled holobiont is useful. This applies to the paradigmatic cases 
as well – anatomical, physiological and developmental integration, discussed by Gilbert 
et al., are all matters of degree. 
Parallel vertical transmission 
To match the holobiont evolutionary structure the host genome and the symbiont 
genomes must be tightly coupled evolutionarily, paradigmatically by being transmitted in 
tandem. Important support for the holobiont perspective is thus the mounting evidence 
for systems in which contained symbionts are transmitted vertically, alongside the host 
genome (Gilbert et al, this volume). This is used to support the claim that holobionts can 
be units of selection qua replicators (see Lloyd, this volume). 
To have the same structure, the cultural evolution case also has to demonstrate 
that the cultural host genome and the genomes of group members are transmitted in 
tandem when groups reproduce. The vertical transmission of individual genomes (as well 
as traits) when daughter groups form from individuals of the parent group, say by fission, 
is straightforward. What is more challenging in the cultural group case is the transmission 
of the group traits, analogous to the transmission of the host genome. 
The two cases thus raise different questions: in the holobiont case the 
transmission of the host is a given, while the vertical transmission of the symbionts needs 
to be demonstrated; in the cultural case the transmission of the group members is a given, 
while the transmission of the culture is what calls for further explanation. Since the 
discussion of symbiont transmission is covered by other chapters in this volume, I will 
concentrate on the transmission of the cultural group-traits to see how well CGS matches 
the holobiont structure of evolution. 
One way to approach this issue is to consider the more general question of 
whether culture is best viewed as the collection of individual psychological states in the 
group and their relationships (the reductive view) or whether culture is best viewed, in 
some relevant sense to be determined, as going beyond that (the holist/emergentist view). 
Two cases that raise challenges to the individualist perspective are social power and 
social institutions. Consider the example of stealing sheep introduced by Geertz (1973; 
see discussion in Lewens 2015). The knowledge of how to steal sheep may be best 
understood at the level of individuals, who learn directly or through others how to get the 
job done. However, it is not as clear that this is the correct kind of description for 
understanding what is involved in a society with a notion of ownership, which is a 
necessary condition for stealing sheep to be intelligible. Personal property and ownership 
rights are social institutions that seem to involve more than a snapshot of individual traits 
and their relationships at a point in time. This is clearly the case in complex societies, in 
which legal statutes, court systems and police are all key parts of property rights, but 
even simple societies have social institutions that may resist simple reductive 
explanation. 
Whether all cultural phenomena can be reduced to individual states and 
interactions raises many issues that I am not going to discuss. The issue ultimately leads 
back to the question of methodological individualism in the social sciences, implicitly or 
explicitly endorsed by prominent cultural evolution scholars. Instead, I want to illustrate 
how the holistic/emergetist view and the reductive view relate to the issue of heredity of 
the cultural host genome, and thus to the question of whether the cultural case matches 
the holobiont structure. 
Consider the reductive view that institutions are group level equilibria that arise 
from individuals’ interactions and norms. When daughter groups are formed by splitting 
from the parent group, then if we assume that daughter groups contain a good enough 
sample of the original culture, the group level equilibria should presumably persist. So in 
this case the requirements of the holobiont structure are apparently met. More complex, 
internally organized social institutions, especially if they involve social division of labor 
and social hierarchy, may not be so directly reproduced in daughter groups and may thus 
be more fragile. To clarify, the issue is not whether reductive accounts can provide 
analyses of complex institutions like property or marriage, questions theoreticians have 
addressed (see Lewens 2015). Rather, the questions that the holobiont structure highlights 
are whether such cultural institutions are transmitted or reestablished with enough fidelity 
when groups reproduce, and, if they are, how is this achieved. 
In some formal models of cultural evolution the analogy to the holobiont case is 
stronger than in the reductive approach, since groups have group level traits that are 
copied when groups propagate (see Bowles and Gintis 2011). These traits are analogous 
to the host’s genome in paradigmatic holobionts, making the models structurally 
analogous to holobionts. 
In addition to vertical transmission and natural selection, CGS discusses two other 
routes through which group traits can spread (Richerson et al. 2016). The first route is 
selective imitation of successful groups. This happens when individuals in one group 
copy behaviors of successful members of another group. The second route is selective 
migration, in which individuals migrate to more successful groups, thus leading inferior 
groups to collapse or reform. Both these processes are selective and reduce variation 
between groups; however they do not involve group reproduction. 
The holobiont perspective highlights three processes affecting holobiont variation 
that go beyond holobiont reproduction and selection: microbial amplification, acquisition 
of symbionts from the environment, and horizontal gene transfer. Microbial amplification 
refers to changes in the relative abundance of microorganisms in the microbiome, 
reflecting their success in given conditions. Acquisition of symbionts from the 
environment depends on the abundance of different symbionts in the environment 
(possibly from, but not restricted to, other holobiont individuals) and may be highly 
regulated. Horizontal gene transfer involves transfer of alleles between genomes, a 
process most commonly encountered in bacteria. These three process affect variation at 
the holobiont level (i.e., between holobionts), as do the somewhat similar processes 
highlighted by CGS. 
In both of these cases, CGS and holobionts, there are selective variational 
processes. In the CGS model these are selective imitation and selective migration, while 
in holobionts both amplification and acquisition may be selective processes. 
Amplification involves natural selection among the symbionts, which may be shaped by 
the environment constructed by the host. Acquisition from the environment may involve 
selective attraction of specific species of bacteria, selective retention, resistance to 
unwanted partners, immunity and so on. The well-studied Vibrio-squid system 
demonstrates just how intricate selective acquisition can be. In this symbiotic partnership, 
the bioluminescent bacteria populate the light organ of the bobtail squid, allowing it to 
not cast a shadow on moonlit nights and so avoid predators. The squid emits and acquires 
the bacteria daily and only V. fischeri can maintain stable association with the host 
(Lloyd this volume, Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg (2008), Lamm and Kammar 
(2014)). Generally speaking, selective acquisition processes affect both 
between-holobiont similarity and parent-offspring similarity and tend to reduce variation. 
The conceptual relations between selective processes and reproduction are the 
subject of philosophical debate. In her discussion of holobionts as reproducers, Lloyd 
(this volume) analyzes these processes and contrasts her view with that of Godfrey-Smith 
(2009), noting: 
Godfrey-Smith conflates and combines reproduction (the replicator/reproducer) 
and selection (the interactor, the entity which that possesses “variation in 
character,” and which “leads to differences in reproductive output” when 
functioning as an interactor) into his single concept of a ‘Darwinian Population.’ 
Lloyd argues that “the means and methods of reproduction” should be kept separate from 
the consideration of “selection processes involving interactors.” Godfrey-Smith, in 
contrast, emphasizes the co-evolutionary opportunities afforded by the possibly 
independent heredity of the symbiotic partners, especially with the construction of 
symbiotic partnerships through the acquisition of symbionts from the environment, as 
happens in the development of the light organ in the squid. The emphasis on coevolution 
is also found in the arguments of biologists objecting to the unit of selection claim of the 
hologenome theory (Moran and Sloan 2015). 
The two perspectives reveal valid points. It is necessary for holobionts to be 
lineage forming entities, with robust parent-offspring similarity, if selection is to operate. 
But, as Lloyd notes, this does not determine the allowed processes of reproduction. The 
selective processes affecting both cultural groups and holobionts operate ontogenetically 
and a developmental approach to heredity, as argued for in James Griesemer’s reproducer 
concept, is more helpful than the traditional notion of replicator. In other words, 
parent-offspring resemblance need not depend on vertical transmission. On the other 
hand, Godfrey-Smith is correct in pointing out the coevolutionary possibilities that a 
focus on the unit of selection question may obscure. As the debates on both holobionts 
and CGS show, the main burden in these debates is evidential. It is not a trivial matter to 
interpret the empirical signature, either to determine the evolutionary or coevolutionary 
origin of a particular holobiont or in order to make a general claim about what is the 
typical case (Hester et al. 2015). 
Processes that produce and maintain variation 
Variation is required for natural selection. However, natural selection, coupled with 
selective processes like those discussed in the previous section tends to reduce variation. 
Evolution is thus an interplay between variation-producing and variation-reducing 
processes. Multiple, diverse, and complicated processes are involved in producing 
similarity and variation in both holobionts and cultural groups. This is reflected in the 
scientific literature, which emphasizes variation-producing and variation-reducing 
processes and empirical measurement of variation over discussions of replication. This 
can be seen in both the CGS literature (Richerson et al. 2016) and in the holobiont 
literature (Hester et al. 2015). 
The holobiont perspective suggests acquisition of new symbionts from the 
environment and horizontal transfer as variation producing processes. Analogous ways of 
creating variation may not seem as relevant to the cultural group case as they are to 
paradigmatic holobionts. Immigrants can, of course, supply a population with new skills; 
and attraction and reception of immigrants involve social institutions. While selective 
migration from dysfunctional groups is one of the processes highlighted by CGS, it refers 
to individuals joining the successful group and accepting its culture, reducing variation 
between groups. One important mechanism that maintains inter-group variation is the 
marking of group members to distinguish between them and outsiders. This can be done 
through dress, dialect, religion and so on (Richerson et al. 2016). Such markings can be 
used to ensure that only group members receive the benefits of group membership. They 
also increase the cost of immigration into the group or even bar it altogether. These 
processes are analogous to selective acquisition of symbionts, which, as I noted in the 
previous section, can involve selective retention but also selective attraction of profitable 
symbiotic partners by the holobiont. 
Summarizing, CGS mostly considers migration as reducing variation, and 
enforcing group boundaries as a mechanism for maintaining variation, whereas in the 
holobiont literature there is more emphasis on acquisition as increasing variation. 
Evolvability 
In cultural group selection, selection operating between culturally diverse groups can 
select for genetic predispositions to pro-social or group advantageous behavior. The 
result is gene-culture coevolution, in which social institutions play an important role. 
Natural selection between groups (i.e., at the holobiont as interactor level), however, is 
considered to be relatively slow (Soltis, Boyd, and Richerson 1995; Richerson et al. 
2016). The two other processes CGS points to, namely selective imitation and selective 
migration, favor group beneficial institutions and norms. These processes are 
individual-level processes, possibly affected by social institutions, rather than group level 
processes. So even putting aside the interaction between genetic and cultural evolution, 
we find several cultural evolutionary processes that can affect the evolvability of the 
holobiont: those operating on individuals as well as selection on groups. 
The hologenome theory also addresses evolvability. It claims that holobionts are 
able to respond more quickly to changing environmental challenges because 
microorganisms evolve more quickly than their multi-cellular host alone. Assuming 
vertical transmission, changes in the microbiome will then be transmitted when the 
holobiont reproduces (in effect establishing inheritance of acquired characteristics). How 
changes in the symbiont population produced by natural selection affect the holobiont 
population when symbionts are acquired from the environment requires more careful 
consideration than I can attempt here. 
Coevolution 
Since both the host and the symbionts have genomes, the evolutionary dynamics in the 
holobiont structure of evolution may involve coevolution between host and symbionts. 
One of the central debates about the evolution of holobionts is whether they evolved 
through coevolution of several parties with diverse interests or through selection on the 
holobiont, as the hologenome theory argues. Lloyd is correct that this debate is in danger 
of conflating the holobiont as interactor and the holobiont as reproducer. The holobiont as 
interactor may be the context in which microorganisms are selected. 
Even if it is accepted that holobionts can be units of selection, the claim that a 
particular holobiont evolved through selection at that level rather than through the 
coevolution of the host and partners requires careful interpretation of evidence (Moran 
and Sloan 2015). It is, for example, possible that a trait that is helpful for the holobiont 
(e.g., bioluminescence), and is suggestive of design, in fact evolved for other purposes by 
the symbionts, prior to and independently of the holobiont, and was later co-opted, in 
which case there was neither coevolution nor selection at the holobiont level (Lamm and 
Kammar 2014). Parallel phylogenies of two species are evidence against preadaptation, 
but do not distinguish between coevolution and selection at the holobiont level. The 
stronger claim that many or most holobionts are the result of selection at the holobiont 
level rather than coevolution requires statistical interpretation of variation in multiple 
holobionts and evidence from multiple kinds of biological systems. This kind of data can 
alter our beliefs about which is more probable, coevolution or holobiont selection (Hester 
et al. 2015). 
The debate concerning cultural group selection takes a very different form than 
does the debate about holobionts. The CGS model argues for culture led gene-culture 
co-evolution, in which cultural differences between groups lead to selection on genes for 
pro-sociality and group advantageous behavior. The “tribal social instincts hypothesis” 
suggests that, once cultural groups came to exist due to the transmission of simple social 
norms, these norms exerted selection pressure for pro-social genes by causing 
misbehaving individuals to be punished and by affecting mate choice and child neglect 
(Richerson et al. 2016). So, unlike the debate about holobionts, in the CGS model 
coevolution is a feature, not a bug: culture led gene-culture coevolution is not an 
alternative to CGS but what you expect CGS to produce; hence evidence for coevolution 
is evidence for CGS. In other words, the coevolutionary extension of the CGS model 
includes selection between cultural groups, but adds coevolution to the claim that groups 
can be units of selection. 
The alternative to culture led gene-culture coevolution is the hypothesis that the 
necessary cognitive adaptations for full-fledged human culture evolved independently of 
concomitant evolutionary changes in culture, either predating them or as a reaction to 
changes in social organization or culture that happened for independent reasons. Such 
magic-moment or key innovation accounts posit that a single adaptive change, be it 
cooking (suggested by Richard Wrangham), cooperative reproduction (Sarah Hrdy), or 
language, which happened before or is independent of cultural and genetic changes that 
ensued, set the ball rolling on the evolution of human culture and cognition (Sterelny 
2012; Lamm 2014). Coevolutionary accounts, on the other hand, are based on 
bidirectional influences (Lamm and Kammar 2014), and it is often suggested that 
coevolutionary spirals can lead to increasing complexity, which is otherwise hard to 
explain. 
Evolutionary Psychology competes with the coevolutionary account, arguing that 
social cognition evolved in the Pleistocene without cultural changes playing a 
coevolutionary role (Tooby and Cosmides 1995; Richerson et al. 2016). Another 
suggestion is that the cognitive capacities underlying culture are pre-adaptations that 
evolved before cultural transmission (Ayala 2010). One kind of evidence that would 
support these hypotheses might be that cognitive changes, say docility, evolved early, 
probably before cultural transmission. Compare this with the bioluminescence 
Vibrio-squid case (Dunlap et al. 2007). If bioluminescence evolved prior to symbiosis, as 
evidence from non-symbiotic species supports, a coevolutionary origin of 
bioluminescence would be rejected. If, alternatively, we find evidence of parallel 
diversification of Vibrio and squid species we may suspect coevolution occurred. 
However, evidence of parallel diversification does not rule out the holobiont hypothesis 
that the symbiotic system was the unit of selection – both the coevolutionary and the unit 
of selection hypotheses remain viable. 
If social institutions appeared late, only in the Holocene, then it is probable that 
the cognitive capacities for culture evolved beforehand and are preadaptations. However, 
the evidence according to Richerson et al. is that even in the simplest family-based and 
egalitarian hunter-gatherer societies, like the Ju/’hoansi (!Kung) and Shoshone, social 
institutions that differ from society to society structure social interaction to a significant 
degree. In addition, multi-family camps and regional networks are found. They conclude 
that “a reasonable assumption is that Late Pleistocene foragers exhibited a range of 
institutional complexity comparable to modern day foragers” (Richerson et al. 2016) and 
hence the coevolutionary CGS model is supported. 
Cheaters 
The central issue in understanding the evolution of sociality is the problem of free-riders 
or cheaters. Free-riders enjoy the benefits of the social behavior of others but do not 
contribute in return. If social behavior is altruistic in the sense of reducing the fitness of 
the individual and increasing the fitness of others, non-altruistic behavior, or free-riding, 
will drive out altruistic behavior. A significant literature deals with how biological 
altruism may nonetheless evolve, keeping free-riders at bay. Evolution of new levels of 
individuality is typically taken to imply a suppression or regulation of the independent 
evolutionary destiny of previously independent constituents, be they genes, independent 
cells, or non-social organisms, in favor of the new collective individual, be it a 
chromosome, a multi-cellular organism, or a social group (see Michod, this volume). A 
variety of biological mechanisms evolved to ensure this. Gilbert et al. (this volume) 
suggest: 
The immune system may have evolved for the suppression of potential “cheaters,” 
those lower-level parts of the group that would proclaim their own autonomy and 
that would multiply at the expense of the others (Tauber 2000, 2009; Ulvestad 
2007; Eberl 2010; Pradeu 2010). The problem of “cheaters” then has to be solved 
in such a way that associates in a symbiotic relationship are under the social 
control of the whole, the holobiont (Stearns 2007).  
Similarly, policing behaviors in human groups (punishment), norms, social institutions, 
and social emotions, may have evolved along similar lines. It is worth noting that some 
theorists suggest side stepping the issue of the evolution of altruism by locating the origin 
of social behavior in mutualistic interactions (Skyrms 2001; Sterelny 2012; Tomasello 
2014). This matches the logic of the holobiont perspective, with its emphasis on mutually 
beneficial symbiosis and “team selection.” 
Concluding remarks 
The analogy between cultural group selection and holobionts leaves me with mixed 
feelings and some tentative conclusions. The similarity is significant, even though human 
groups are not tightly-coupled holobionts, nor holobiontic individuals. Identifying a 
common structure of evolution in both the hologenome theory and cultural group 
selection helped hone in on common theoretical and evidential challenges that affect both 
notions, despite the fact that they are concerned with very different domains. The major 
questions I discussed are: the use of evidence to distinguish between pre-adaptations, 
coevolution, and selection at the holobiont level; the evolvability properties of holobionts 
of the two kinds; and the role of developmental processes in group reproduction. 
The structure of evolution, as characterized at the beginning of this chapter, 
specifies the unique evolutionarily properties that differentiate holobionts from other 
evolutionary scenarios. It is thus the appropriate way to generalize from the discussion of 
particular holobionts. Some of the evolutionary properties of the holobiont structure 
depend on selection at the holobiont level, others are independent of it. A more rigorous 
model of the holobiont structure than I could provide here seems like a worthwhile goal. 
I also indicated several aspects of current scientific debate that the focus by 
philosophers on the unit of selection discussion may obscure. The debate I have in mind 
is concerned with the evidence for selection at the holobiont level and with its 
prevalence, not with whether selection at the holobiont level is conceptually possible. The 
major alternative explanation of the phenomena is coevolution. The conceptual 
discussion of holobionts as units of selection cannot settle the empirical debate about the 
evolutionary significance of selection between holobionts as compared to coevolution. 
The holobiont structure account I presented also does not aim to settle this. On the 
contrary, both coevolution and selection at the holobiont level are features of the 
holobiont structure. 
Finally, there is the question of the hologenome theory, which posits the 
combined hologenome consisting of the host and microbiome genomes as the unit of 
selection. Is this theory limited to symbiosis of multi-cellular hosts and microorganisms 
or can fundamental ideas from it be formulated in generic, structural, terms? Overall, the 
exercise here points in the direction of the former option. The hologenome theory comes 
from microbiology and highlights distinctive properties of symbiosis with microbiota, 
such as horizontal gene transfer and rapid evolution. And yet, the more general notion of 
a holobiont structure of evolution may guide thinking about other similarly structured 
collective phenomena, in particular the evolution of human cultural groups, and organize 
their analysis. 
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1 A unit of selection is also a structure of evolution, but it is typically taken to play a more 
fundamental role than the other structures I discuss. 
 
